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Export Performance in the Reform Era: Has India Regained the Lost Ground?
During the first four decades of the post-independence era India continued to remain an underperformer in world export markets, relative to both her own potential and the performance of many other developing countries. The consensus of the sizeable literature on this subject is that domestic economic polices, rather than external demand conditions, were largely to be blamed for the poor export performance. 1 The overriding aim of the Indian development policy from the inception was across-theboard import substitution in the context of a foreign trade regime which relied extensively on quantitative restrictions (QRs). Until about the mid-1970s the overall policy trend was towards tightening controls on both foreign trade and domestic industry. The pull of resources into import-substitution industries by the high level of protection, plus overvaluation of the real exchange rate resulting from upwards shift in demand for imports and a rate of domestic inflation above that of trading partners, discouraged production for export. Also, the inflexibilities created by the pervasive controls on domestic manufacturing handicapped the ability of firms to penetrate export markets.
As a reaction to the foreign exchange constraint on economic growth, export promotion was recognized as a policy goal in the late 1960s, but export performance continued to be constrained fundamentally by "the inward-looking framework in which exports are treated essentially as an after thought" (Wolf 1982: 12) . Also, the export incentives granted were concentrated on a few manufacturing sectors and most 1 The first systematic analysis of India's export performance and potential, which cogently argued that India's export stagnation was largely 'home made', was by Manmohan Singh (Singh 1964) . Since then, there have been a number of other important analyses in the same vein, reinforcing the view that India's exports could be significantly increased through policy reforms and poor export performance was a significant factor in India's lack-luster economic performance in general (eg. Wolf 1982 , Bhagwati and Desai 1970 , Bahagwati and Srinivasan 1975 , Krueger 1975 , Joshi and Little 1994 . The title of this paper has been adapted from Singh (1966) : 'The ground lost as a result of neglecting exports in the past could [not] be easily reversed in the future ' (p. v) .
agricultural exports were not eligible for these incentives but subjected to export duties at varying rates. Some liberalization took place during 1975-1991, especially during the last five to seven years, including progressive loosening of import controls and increase in subsidies to exporters of manufactured goods. However, in the absence of significant policy initiatives to redress exchange rate overvaluation and domestic industrial licensing, the policy bias against export performance remained virtually unchanged (Joshi and Little 1994) . Thus, sluggish export growth continued to act as a drag on economic growth, both by impairing capacity to import developmental imports and by limiting the expansion of domestic industry to the confine of the domestic market.
The Growth was not merely low but also distorted; failure to penetrate word markets in labour-intensive products infused an undue capital-intensity bias to domestic manufacturing, with adverse implications for employment generation, income distribution and poverty alleviation (Bhagwati 1993) . in policy regimes: the immediate post-independence period characterised by liberal trade and investment policies, the era of economic dirigisme from the early 1960s, the period of reforms by stealth from the late 1970s and the era of significant liberalization reforms since 1991. This is followed by an analysis of comparative export experience by major commodity categories, changing revealed comparative advantage in world trade and factor-intensity characteristics of the emerging export patterns. The final section draws policy inferences, with a focus on the contemporary debate on the feasibility and the desirability (from the view point of laying a solid foundation for achieving sustained, equitable growth) of bypassing the stage of labour-intensive export expansion.
Export Trends
India's merchandise exports grew (in current US$ terms) at an annual arte of about 5% in the first there decades of post-independent period in a context whether world export was expanding at an annual rate of over 10%. Consequently India's share of world none-oil exports fell persistently from 2.3 in the 1950s to 0.6% in the 1970s (Table 1) .
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Notwithstanding some selective measures introduced to ameliorate the anti-export bias, India's export growth rates continued to remain below world trends in the 1980s, and India's share world market share fell to an average level of 0.5%.
Table 1 about here
As can be seen in disaggregated data reported in Panel c in Table 1 , the fall in India's share in total exports from developing countries during the period was much sharper (from 3.2 in the 1960s to 1.5% during the 1980s) compared to the fall in her share of total world exports. Moreover, India's failure to keep up with overall export performance of other developing countries is much more clearly visible in manufacturing trade; India share in total manufacturing exports from developing countries plummeted from 10.2% in the 1960s to 2.6% in the 1980s (Figure 1 ). In 1962/3 (the earliest years for which comparable country-level data are available) India was the second largest exporter of manufactured good in the developing world (accounting for 17.8% of exports) after Hong Kong (19.8%) ( Table 2 ). The ranking dropped to the 9 th position in 1979/80, when India accounted for only 4.3% of total manufacturing exports from developing countries. By the time of 1991 reforms, India was the tenth largest exporter (2.6%) after the Philippines (2.9%) and India's export share amounted to less than one eighth of that of China (25.5%). The degree of export orientation of the economy, measured by exports to GDP ratio, remained virtually unchanged around 6% throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 2 ). 
Export Patterns
In this section India's export performance is examined from a comparative regional (Asian) perspective against the backdrop of pre-reform experience and the on-going changes in patterns of international production. The relevant data are summarized in Table 3 and 4. has not yet begun to reflect in her export structure. India's export structure is notable for its heavy reliance on resource-based manufacturing (SITC 6) which accounted for India's share in world textile and clothing and exports (3.2% in 2005/6) -a key indicator of early stage, labour-intensive exports -was only little more than that of Bangladesh (2.6%).
Figure 3 about here
Revealed comparative advantage
What are the products in which India has performed better in world markets compared to its overall export performance? Has the list of products which meet this criterion expanded or shrunk during the reform era? A useful analytical tool that helps answer these issues is the index of revealed comparative advantage (RCAI), which measures a country's relative export performance in individual product categories compared to its overall export performance in world trade (Balassa 1965) .
The RCAI of a given country (country I) in the export of product j is defined
as:
where, is country I's exports of commodity J, is world export of commodity j, is total exports of all goods from country I, and is world exports of all goods. If the value of RCAI exceeds unity for commodity J, the country is said to have 'revealed' comparative advantage in the production of that commodity. In contrast, if RCAI is below one, the country is at a comparative disadvantage in the production of the commodity. Classification (SITC). The analysis covers total merchandise exports excluding oil and gas (STIC 3) and special export items listed under SITC 9. In Table 6 , RCAIs are reported together with data on percentage composition of exports and world market share of each commodity to facilitate the analysis. The table covers all threedigit products with a 'revealed comparative advantage' (that is 1<RCAI, referred to as 'RCA products' in the following discussion) in any of the three time points.
The first impression from a comparison of RCA estimates is that the revealed comparative advantage in world trade of both countries is broad-based, unlike that of many developing countries whose strength in international exchange lies in one or a few products. This pattern is only to be expected for an economy like India with a diver resource base. However, there is no clear evidence as yet of a clear pattern of export specialization emerging; revealed comparative advantage is dispersed over a large number of products. In 1990/91 there we there were 47 RCA products which accounted for 81% of total exports. The number of products increased to 61 in 2004/5, but their combined share in total exports declined to 72%. 
Factor Intensity Decomposition of Merchandise Export
As noted at the outset, a much written-about aspect of pre-reform export performance in India is the inconsistency of export patterns in line with the country's intrinsic comparative advantage in labour intensive products. Has this pattern changed during the reform era? A definitive answer to this question can only come a systematic analysis of the link between emerging export patterns and changing factor proportions in domestic manufacturing through micro-level industrial performance data. This is beyond the scope of this study. Here we simply attempt to gain some preliminary insights by using the standard method of factor proportion decomposition of reported export pioneered by Lary (1968) and developed subsequently by Leamer (1983) and others.
This method is based on the assumption that factor intensity rankings of industries/products are internationally consistent, that is, an industry that was relatively labour-intensive in a poor country was similarly so in a rich country. The validity of this assumption has become highly questionable because of the on-going process of international production fragmentation, which has opened up opportunities for countries to specialize in various segments of the production process within has not yet become prominent on the export side. Despite notable tariff reforms since the early 1990s, tariff protection in India is still substantially higher than in most other developing countries in the region. While a systematic analysis of the anti-export bias in the incentive regime is yet to be done, the available data on minimal and effective rates of protection (reported in Tables 7 and 8) suggest that the incentive structure still discriminates against export-oriented production and in favour of domestic-market oriented production. The effective rate of protection for domestic production in India is more than twice of the average level in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Moreover, in India, consumer goods industries, which are the basis for labour-intensive manufacturing export expansion, are generally more insulated from international competition compared to capital and intermediate goods industries. In addition to relatively tariffs, India also rank poorly among Asian countries in terms of various other indicators of ease of doing business across border (Table 9 ) There is also a significant unfinished agenda of 'behind-the-border' reform.
Regulation impacting on private sector activities has become less onerous since the start of the reforms, but there are various are sector-specific regulations in abundance.
While, the 'the License Raj' (the infamous industrial licensing policy) has been largely eliminated at the centre, it still survives at the state level, along with a pervasive 'Inspector Raj'. Private investors require a large number of permissions (eg.
Electricity and water supply connections, water supply clearance etc.) from state governments to start business and they also have to interact with the state bureaucracy in the course of day-to-day business. Notwithstanding some relaxation in recent years, These issues are reflected in India's poor ranking among the countries in the region, in particular the dynamic export-oriented economies in East Asia, in terms of various indicators of ease of doing business (Table 10) . 
